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Abstract
This study aims to build a novel setup combining the process of entrepreneurial finance (i.e.
the process of search and matching between entrepreneurs and capitalists), with the standard
monopoly union framework, within a general endogenous growth model.
The idea motivating this research can be described as follows. One the one hand, en-
trepreneurs need to raise capital for their ventures; on the other hand, capitalists are the ones
who provide that capital to the projects they think are the most valuable. Hence, through the
process of matching entrepreneurs with capitalists, trade unions might influence this relationship
by raising (lowering) wages and, thus, increasing (decreasing) costs and reducing (increasing)
profitability.
This study follows the standard endogenous growth approach where the economy is com-
posed by three sectors: (1) a final good sector in which the good is produced competitively
employing unionized labour, to whom is paid a wage according to the monopoly union model;
(2) an intermediate good sector, in which each intermediate good is produced and sold by a
monopolistic firm; and (3) a R&D sector, which employs entrepreneurs and capitalists to intro-
duce new varieties of intermediate goods. The innovations selected by capitalists in the R&D
sector to be financed are then patented and sold to the intermediate good firms that monopolize
the market for that particular product. Trade unions influence the wages of final good sector
workers.
This type of framework allows to study the relationship between unions, entrepreneurs and
capitalists through an endogenous growth perspective. In the end, it aims to provide some
highlights on this relationship as well as on its impacts on growth, allocation of work between
sectors and innovation.
Keywords: Financing of innovation; Trade unions; Endogenous growth
JEL-Codes: 031; J51; Q56
iii
Resumo
Este estudo tem como objetivo construir um modelo que combine o processo de financia-
mento dos empreendedores (ou seja, o processo de correspondeˆncia entre empreendedores e
capitalistas), com o modelo do sindicato monopolista, dentro de um modelo de crescimento
endo´geno geral.
A ideia que motiva este estudo pode ser descrita a seguir. Por um lado, os empreendedores
precisam de obter capital para seus empreendimentos; por outro lado, os capitalistas fornecem
esse capital aos projetos que analisam como sendo os mais valiosos. Assim, atrave´s deste
processo de correspondeˆncia entre empreendedores e capitalistas, os sindicatos podem influenciar
esta relac¸a˜o ao aumentar (diminuir) os sala´rios e, assim, aumentar (diminuir) os custos e reduzir
(aumentar) a lucro empresarial.
Este estudo segue a abordagem padra˜o do crescimento endo´geno, no qual a economia e´
composta por treˆs setores: (1) um setor final, no qual o bem e´ produzido de forma competitiva
empregando ma˜o-de-obra sindicalizada, a quem e´ pago um sala´rio de acordo com o modelo do
sindicato monopolista; (2) um setor intermedia´rio, no qual cada bem intermedia´rio e´ produzido
e vendido por uma empresa monopolista; e (3) um setor de I&D, que emprega empreendedores e
capitalistas para introduzir novas variedades de bens intermedia´rios. As inovac¸o˜es selecionadas
para serem finanicadas pelos capitalistas no setor de I&D sa˜o enta˜o patenteadas e vendidas para
as empresas intermedia´rias que monopolizam o mercado para essa variedade em particular. Os
sindicatos influenciam os sala´rios dos trabalhadores do setor final.
Este modelo permite estudar a relac¸a˜o entre sindicatos, empreendedores e capitalistas atrave´s
de uma perspectiva de crescimento endo´geno. No final, e´ pretendido obter concluso˜es sobre esta
relac¸o˜es, bem como sobre seus impactos no crescimento, alocac¸a˜o de trabalho entre setores e
inovac¸a˜o.
Palavras-chave: Financiamento da inovac¸a˜o; Sindicatos; Crescimento endo´geno
Co´digos JEL: 031; J51; Q56
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1 Introduction
The process of the entrepreneurs “creating” innovation typically faces multiple obstacles
that several times drive them to failure. One of the major problems is the difficulty that
entrepreneurs find in gathering enough capital to finance their ideas, i.e., the problem of
financing the innovation.
This dissertation focuses on how trade unions affect the interaction between en-
trepreneurs looking for capital and capitalists who provide it. Trade unions might in-
fluence this relationship between these two agents by affecting wages and, consequently,
changing the willingness of entrepreneurs to invest time in coming up with new ideas and
the decision of capitalists to finance them.
Indeed, evidence shows that unions can influence the level of wages and the general
conditions for their members, even if we take into account that their membership has been
declining over the past years.1 For instance, a study found for UK that the union wage
premium – the gap between the hourly earnings of union members and non-members
– was 16% in the public sector and 7% in the private sector.2 Moreover, their actions
are also of a major importance in bringing media attention to new legislation that can
potentially harm workers. For example, trade unions have recently taken actions in UK
to increase “workers voice” in companies3, whereas in France they are raising awareness
to Macron’s liberal agenda, a debate which would be difficult to have without them.4
Hence, we propose a novel novel setup combining the process of entrepreneurial fi-
nance, combining the contribution of Giordani (2015) with the standard monopoly union
framework. Our main conclusions can be summarized as follows: (a) a higher trade
union’s markup corresponds to a higher (lower) level of employment in the final good
(entrepreneur and capitalist) sector(s); (b) it is possible to infer that an a higher bargain-
ing power of entrepreneurs effects the effectiveness of trade union’s markup of reallocating
1The Guardian view on trade unions: needed as much as ever. (2016, December). Re-
trieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/19/the-guardian-view-on-trade-
unions-needed-as-much-as-ever
2Holmes, R. (2017, February). With women at the forefront, the unions are relevant again. Retrieved
from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/feb/22/women-trade-unions-gender-pay-gap-
discrimination
3O’Connor, S. (2017, July). Taylor report to call for more ‘voice’ for UK workers. Retrieved from:
https://www.ft.com/content/422b3c9a-6248-11e7-91a7-502f7ee26895?mhq5j=e1
4Stothard, M. (2017, May). French unions move quickly to resist Macron’s labour reforms. Retrieved
from: https://www.ft.com/content/5f80f0ae-34a9-11e7-99bd-13beb0903fa3?mhq5j=e1
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individuals from being an entrepreneur to a worker in the final good sector.
The rest of this dissertation proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the first biblio-
metric exercise on the topic. Section 3 presents and explains the proposed theoretical
model, following the contributions of Giordani (2015) and Neto et. al. (2017). Section
4 analyzes the model under the balanced growth path and provides some comparative
statistics of the model. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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2 Literature Review
This study is broadly related with the literature regarding entrepreneurship, innova-
tion, trade unions and economic growth.
In the first section, we develop a bibliometric analysis of the literature in which it is
explained the criteria used to choose the articles that were firstly analyzed.
Next, it will be presented the complete literature review. The concept of entrepreneur-
ship is clarified, followed by the literature regarding financing of entrepreneurship activi-
ties (financing of innovation) and the effects of entrepreneurship in employment, produc-
tivity and economic growth.
In the third section, trade unions are introduced and it is discussed their role on wages
and labour as well as their effects on economic growth.
Finally, in the fourth and final subsection, some concluding remarks are presented
regarding the reviewed literature, and it is explained the gap that exists in the literature
that we are proposing to explore in this study.
2.1 Bibliometric Analysis
2.1.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses how the literature reviewed was selected for this study and the
details on the search procedure are shown and discussed in detail. The section closes
with some statistics of the selected sample of studies.
2.1.2 Initial Search - Sample Search Procedure
The initial search for articles was based on a review of the abstracts from articles pub-
lished in all economic journals gathered from the Scopus database. The first terms from
1993 onwards introduced in the Scopus database were “trade unions” and “financing of
innovation”, using the subject/keywords search procedure. However, no articles relating
these topics were found.
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Consequently, the strategy changed and the terms “entrepreneur” and “endogenous
growth” were used as the search keywords. Once again the search was done for articles
from 1993 and limited only to subject/keywords to minimize the number of non-related
articles. This search resulted in a total number of 93 papers. These papers were ana-
lyzed individually and the articles that did not specifically treat the entrepreneurship-
endogenous growth question were disqualified from the bibliometric exercise. In the end,
39 papers remained.
A similar exercise was done in Scopus using the terms “trade unions” and “economic
growth” from 1993. This search resulted a total of 89 papers. After disqualification of
non-relevant articles, 33 papers remained to be analyzed.
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2.1.3 Main Findings
Following Neto and Silva (2013) all the publications that remained in this research
were categorized in terms of methodology, namely within five possible alternatives:
. Formal (F): if the main purpose of the paper is to build a theoretical, abstract
model/argument attempting to explain the relationship between entrepreneurship and
economic growth;
. Empirical (E): if an econometric and/or statistical analysis is applied;
. Formal and Empirical (F+E): if there is a theoretical model/argument and an
econometric/statistical application of the model/argument;
. Appreciative (AP): if the paper develops an argumentative analysis without any
abstract model or econometric analysis;
. Survey (S): if a literature review or an appraisal is presented.
2.1.4 Main Findings regarding entrepreneurship-growth research
Regarding the link between entrepreneurship and growth, Figure 1 shows that the
categories “empirical” and “formal” account for about 66% of the papers analyzed. Nev-
ertheless, the categories “formal and empirical” and “appreciative” represent an impor-
tant part with, respectively, 18% and 16%. Finally, the remaining category, “survey”,
has a residual role with only 5% of the research.
Considering the evolution pattern over time, represented in Figure 5, it seems that
the categories “formal” and “empirical” have dominated the method of entrepreneurship-
growth research for most of the period analyzed. These categories are not only represented
among others in 2000 and 2007. “Formal and empirical” and “appreciative” are repre-
sented in the years 2004, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2013, 2015 and 2016. The category “survey”
is represented in the years 2000 and 2008. We can conclude that, taking into account
the number of papers of each category, there is a balenced representation through the
considered time period.
Regarding the number of the relevant articles regarding the relationship between en-
trepreneurship and growth and the total gathered number of articles (represented in
Figure 5 by a black line with the percentage values on the right vertical axis), it is
5
Figure 1: Method of entrepreneurship-growth research
possible to track the evolution of the published papers on entrepreneurship-growth re-
search. On average, approximately 42% of the articles that present “entrepreneurship”
and “endogenous growth” as keywords are directly related with the entrepreneurship-
growth relationship. From Figure 2, it is possible to verify that the percentage of papers
related with the research was very inconsistent in the first five years of analysis. Note
that, in 2000 it was 100%, while in 2001 and 2002 it was 0%. After these two years, the
percentage increased from 2003 to 2005, when it reached 100%. From 2005 onwards it
followed a decreasing pattern that oscillated between 30% and 70% until 2014, when the
percentage of entrepreneurship-growth related research was 0%. In the following years,
the percentage was consistent and around 60%. 5
2.1.5 Main Findings regarding trade unions-growth research
Regarding the link between trade unions and growth, Figure 4 shows that the cate-
gories “formal”, “empirical” and “appreciative” account for 87% of the papers analyzed,
representing “24%, 30% and 27%, respectively. The category “formal and empirical” is
the fourth most important with 12% of the trade unions-economic growth related re-
search.
5For presentation issues the results between the years 1993-1999 were excluded from Figure 5 In this
period only two papers were found, one in 1993 and another in 1994.
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Figure 2: Evolution of method of entrepreneurship-growth research over the years
Figure 3: Method of unions-growth research
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Considering the evolution pattern over time, represented in Figure 7, it seems that
the categories “formal”, “empirical” and “appreciative” are relatively evenly distributed,
being at least one of them represented in all the years with representation of some cat-
egory, with the exception of 2012. “Formal and Empirical” increased its weight in the
literature after the first decade of the century, being represented in the years 2010, 2011
and 2012. Besides these years, its also represented in 2000. “Survey” is represented in
distanced moments in time in 2008 and 2014.
Taking into consideration the number of the relevant articles regarding the relationship
between trade unions and growth and the total gathered number of articles, it is possible
to track the evolution of the published papers on trade unions-growth research. On
average, approximately 37% of the articles that present “trade unions” and “economic
growth” as keywords are directly related with the trade unions-growth relationship. From
Figure 4 it is possible to identify two different phases in the evolution pattern. The
first one between 2000 and 2003 is very inconsistent. The years 2000 and 2002 have a
percentage of 100% in the relation between total gathered number of articles and the
relevant ones and 2001 and 2003 have 0%. The second phase is between 2004 and 2016
and its more regular than the previous one. The percentages of total/relevant papers
range from approximately 20% to 75%, reaching peak in 2015. 6
6For presentation issues the results between the years 1993-1999 were excluded from Figure 7. In
this period only one paper was found, in 1993.
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Figure 4: Evolution of method of unions-growth research over the years
2.1.6 Final search
It is worth-noting that the initial research presented on the previous search was com-
plemented through the use of others databases (e.g., B-on), as well as with other research
methods, namely cross-reference checking and existing surveys on the topic. Hence, the
potential errors and lack of information in the sample of papers used in previous literature
review reduced.
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2.2 Literature relating Entrepreneurship, Finance and Economic
Growth
2.2.1 Entrepreneurship
An entrepreneur can be defined as “individual who pursues opportunities for financial
or social gain, often at great financial risk”.7
Empirically, van Praag and Cramer (2001) states two definitions that need to be taken
into account for a firm to be considered entrepreneurial: (a) size; and (b) age. Regarding
the former, for personnel, the most often used measure, the common cutoff point is 100
employees. However, various size classes are often observed and analyzed separately, such
as 10–20, 20–50, 50–100, 100+ employees. In such cases, again 100 employees is used as
the boundary between small and large. In what relates with the latter, most literature
refers to entrepreneurial firms as with less than 5 to 7 years.
Entrepreneurship ability is very important to a nation’s economic development. Knowl-
edge by itself is only a necessary condition for the exercise of successful enterprise. The
ability to transform new knowledge into economic opportunities involves a set of skills,
aptitudes, insights, and circumstances that is neither uniformly nor widely distributed in
the population (Braunerhjelm et al, 2009). In this sense, the entrepreneurship ability is
extremely valued in society.
Schumpeter (1947) stresses the distinction between the inventor and the entrepreneur.
In Schumpeter’s view the inventor produces ideas, while the entrepreneur transforms
ideas into products. An idea or scientific principle is not, by itself, of any importance for
economic practice. Hence, to grow, an economy requires both researchers who produce
inventions and entrepreneurs who implement them. In other words, scientific knowledge
has no economic impact unless some effort is made to spread and apply it (Michelacci,
2003).
If agents are heterogeneous in the ability to come up with ideas and extract their
returns, might be the case that some should specialize themselves in innovation and
others in implementation. The transfer of ideas from innovators to entrepreneurs can
lead to a more efficient use of resources, making all parties better off, therefore increasing
7Definition of entrepreneur (20167, July). Retrieved from:
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=entrepreneur
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incentives to investment in research and revelopment (Silveira et al, 2010).
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2.2.2 Financing of Innovation
As stated in the introduction, this study has a particular focus on the process of
financing entrepreneurs, who have new business ideas and need to gather capital to finance
them.
Assymetries of information between entrepreneurs and capitalists represent a serious
constraint in the market of innovation. According to Antony et al (2011), smaller firms
are relatively more innovative but face more obstacles in accessing the necessary financial
leverage. A similar result was obtained by Gertler (1988), Devereux and Schiantarelli
(1990), Cabral and Mata (2003) and Beck et al. (2006): younger firms are more “credit
constraint” than mature ones. Mata (1996) finds that the biggest part of young firms,
which typically are of small size, are established below their desired size. This is mainly
due to financial constraints. These results are in line with the results of Bernanke et al.
(1994), who finds that smaller firms must provide more collateral than larger ones.
Wagenvoort (2003) and Angelini and Generale (2008) found that, for Europe and
United States, respectively, smaller firms are more credit constrained. Indeed, several
obstacles arise during this process and theoretical arguments proposed to explain finan-
cial market imperfections in the innovation sector range from transaction costs and tax
advantages to agency costs due to informational asymmetries between the innovator and
the financer (Giordani, 2014). These aspects are common to any financing relation, but
for a number of factors, frictions are even higher in the financing of innovative ventures.
The literature regarding the subject highlights three main reasons that make financing
innovation harder than other financing processes.
The first problem associated with capitalists providing capital to entrepreneurs is that
a specific innovation is a unique event, and the process of producing them is uncertain
and largely unpredictable (Cozzi and Giordani, 2011). Therefore, the risk is bigger in this
type of loans, which makes the agreement between the financer and entrepreneur more
expensive to the entrepreneur and riskier to the capitalist.
The second reason relates with the fact that most of the R&D expenditure is likely to
be less tangible and might not serve as a good collateral for external finance (Almeida and
Campello, 2007). Bankruptcy costs are likely to be relatively low for firms with a high
proportion of tangible capital among their assets, particularly property and equipment
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associated with generally applicable technologies, while these costs are likely to be higher
for innovative firms with a higher proportion of intangible assets, such as knowledge and
reputation, and with more specialized equipment. For a given level of debt, the risk
of bankruptcy may also be higher. Both factors suggest that more innovative firms are
likely to be less reliant on debt finance, to minimize expected bankruptcy costs (Aghion
et al, 2004). Once again, a higher risk of credit default of innovators leads to a lower
probability of an agreement between the parts.
Finally, a quality-signaling strategy, which could be used to decrease the problem
of asymmetric information between the entrepreneur and the financier and attenuate his
notion of risk, is hardly implementable in the market of innovation because entrepreneurs
may be reluctant to signal the quality of their own project, as they may reasonably fear
that competitors copy their new idea (Bhattacharya and Ritter 1983).
Because of this problem, the relationship between investors and entrepreneurs have
several agency costs and informational asymmetries that other types of financing relations
usually do not have.
Several authors investigated other types of problems that this asymmetric information
issue can bring into this relationship. For instance, Myers and Majluf (1984) point to
dilution costs of issuing outside equity when managers are better informed than outside
investors about the firm’s financial prospects. Specifically, by selling equity to outside
investors, the firm’s current owners may send a signal to the markets that its future
prospects of revenue are not as good, otherwise they would have chosen instead to keep
being full residual claimant on the firm’s profits (e.g., by issuing debt, rather than equity).
This problem of signaling leads to new share issues being underpriced, which imposes a
dilution cost on the firm’s initial owners. Hence, it is likely that for more innovative firms
there will be a greater degree of asymmetric information between the capital markets
and the firm’s management, increasing these dilution costs that will tend to be even
higher. In this case, new equity will be a particularly expensive source of finance for
these firms. On the other hand, more innovative firms are also likely to generate more
attractive investment opportunities than firms that are less innovative. If so, innovative
firms are also likely to be more reliant on external finance from either debt or equity
than less innovative firms. Less innovative firms are more likely to have sufficient internal
funds to finance all the investment expenditures which they want to pursue. Myers and
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Majluf (1984), with their “pecking order theory of capital structure”, suggest that more
innovative firms are likely to be more reliant on external sources of funds, but are likely to
favor debt over new equity among external sources, to avoid these relatively high dilution
costs.
The literature on this subject is very clear in stating that financing innovation is a
very complex activity that depends on several factors, requiring a deep analysis by both
capitalists and entrepreneurs.
Aghion et al. (2004) analyzed the financial structure of R&D conducting firms. Using
a firm level data set for the U.K., the authors found that the share of traditional debt
finance in the firms’ balance sheets presents an inverted U-shaped form. They state that
firms that report positive but low R&D investments use more debt finance than firms
that report no R&D, but the use of debt finance falls with R&D intensity among those
firms that report R&D activities. They also found that firms that report R&D are more
likely to raise funds by issuing shares than firms that report no R&D, and this probability
increases with R&D intensity. The authors argue that the reason for this is the higher
intangibility of innovative activity which puts a limit on traditional bank lending (the
same results mentioned above by Almeida and Campello, 2004).
Scellato (2007), through the analysis of the Italian manufacturing sector, find out
that the total number of patents granted per year to an establishment is significantly
negatively influenced by the degree of financial constraints the firm is faced with.
Besides all these factors, there are also external conditions that influence the process
of financing by entrepreneurs. For instance, the current state of the financial markets
is a major determinant in the access to credit. The venture capital industry is highly
cyclical, with periodic changes in supply and demand conditions (Gompers and Lerner,
1999; Lerner, 2002).
Gompers and Lerner (2000) find a positive relation between the valuation of new
ventures and capital inflows, implying that increases in the supply of venture capital may
result in greater competition to finance companies and rising valuations.
This fact suggests that the rate of innovation and entrepreneurship ventures depends
on the current conditions of the markets and economy. But the opposite is also true,
economic growth is also deeply influenced by the level of innovation and new companies
that arise in the economic landscape. The ability to go on entrepreneurship ventures is
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important to determine the growth rate of an economy and the role that financers assume
is widely discussed in the literature.
In traditional development economics, there were two schools of thought with sharply
differing perspectives on the potential importance of finance in economic growth.
One one side, Robinson (1952) states that finance is essentially the handmaiden to
industry, responding passively to other factors that produce cross-country differences in
growth. According to this author, economies with growth prospects effectively promote
supporting institutions such as banks and venture capitalists, to provide external funds to
make these systems more efficient. In addition, where economic growth takes place, finan-
cial intermediaries follow. Robinson views the causality between financial development
and economic growth as reversed, where the economic growth the prompter of financial
development. Several economists agree with Robinson’s view, including Robert Lucas
(1988), who feels that the role of finance is over-emphasized in the literature concerning
the determinants of the process of economic growth.
On the other side, economists such as McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) saw fi-
nancial markets as playing a key role in economic activity. In their way of thinking,
differences in the quantity and quality of services provided by financial institutions could
partly explain why countries grew at different rates. Goldsmith (1969, p. 400), states
that financial development “accelerates economic growth and improves economic perfor-
mance to the extent that it facilitates the migration of funds to the best user, i.e., to the
place in the economic system where the funds will earn the highest social return”. Also,
Schumpeter (1969) states that financial intermediaries play an important role in promot-
ing innovations. He argues that economies with more developed and efficient forms of
financial systems tend to grow more quickly than those that do not. The financial sector
provides services which include reallocating capital to the most efficient activities and
highest returns without a high risk of loss through adverse selection, moral hazard or
transaction costs and are seen as an essential catalyst to economic growth (Rajan and
Zingales, 1998).
King et al (1993) states that better financial systems improve the probability of suc-
cessful innovation and consequently accelerate the process of economic growth. Simi-
larly, financial sector distortions reduce the rate of economic growth by their negative
effect on the rate of innovation. The same author also states that a more developed
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financial system enhances productivity improvement by (a) choosing higher quality en-
trepreneurs and business projects; (b) mobilizing more effectively external financing for
these entrepreneurs; (c) providing superior vehicles for diversifying the risk of innovative
activities; and (d) revealing more accurately the potentially large profits associated with
the uncertain business of innovation. Hence, better financial systems stimulate economic
growth by accelerating the rate of productivity enhancement. Laeven et al (2013) states
that financial development leads to higher rates of growth in the capital stock, income,
and productivity. This happens because if capital is redirected away from the less produc-
tive investment opportunities in the economy toward more productive ones, productivity
will go up and the economy’s output will rise further.
Chiu at al. (2017) states that the generation of new ideas and their implementation are
the major factor underlying economic performance and growth, and financial development
plays an important role in this process. Government policies toward financial systems may
also have an important causal effect on long-run growth. Without financial innovations
that enhance the screening of entrepreneurs, economic growth will slow (Laeven et al,
2013).
To sum up, recent studies have employed time-series, cross-country and panel analysis
to take stands in the debate, but overall, while economists agree that financial develop-
ment and economic growth are related, they disagree on the direction of causation (Masih
et al, 2011).
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2.2.3 How Entrepreneurship affects Innovation, Employment, Productivity
and Economic Growth
Contributions to Innovation
To measure innovation of a firm or country, researchers normally use three different
measures: R&D expenditure, number of patents produced, and number of new prod-
ucts/technologies introduced in the market.
Castany et al. (2005) compares the average R&D expenditure per employee of large
and small Spanish firms (being the cut-off point established at 200 employees), between
1990 and 1994, and finds that large firms have allocated around 2.5 times more resources
to research than small firms.
In contrast to this result, Arvanitis (1997) finds identical levels of R&D expenditure
per employee for the largest part of the Swiss firms with less than 300 employees. For
firms with more than 300 employees, the proportional R&D expenditure per employee is
decreasing with firm size.
Yang and Huang (2005) finds evidence that R&D expenditures induces higher growth
rates, especially for small firms. This implies that each dollar spent on research in a small
firm is more valuable than a dollar spent in a large firm and justifies that, proporcionally,
small firms engage in more R&D than large ones.
Regarding the number of patents, there are two streams of thought in the literature.
On one hand, Almeida and Kogut (1997) finds that entrepreneurs produce fewer
patents than established firms in the semiconductor industry in the US. In the same line,
Sørensen and Stuart (2000) provides evidence that the time between patent applications
decreases with firm age and size in that sector and also biotechnology.
On the other hand, Plehn-Dujowich (2007) finds that smaller firms produce up to
four times more patents per dollar spend on R&D than large companies. Additionally,
patents of small firms are significantly more cited by research professionals than patents
of large companies, indicating a higher innovative content of the first ones. Lotti and
Schivardi (2005) studies the patenting behavior of countries, sectors and firms. Through
an exhaustive analysis of data, the author finds that while the probability of patenting
rises with firm size, the patenting intensity (granted patents relative to employment) falls
17
with employment.
The last measure to evaluate innovation is related to new products and technologies
introduced in the economy.
In this subject, Love and Ashcroft (1999) finds that the number of innovations in-
creases with plant size in a sample of more than 300 Scottish plants. Huergo and Jau-
mandreu (2004) examines the probability that a Spanish firm introducing a product or
process innovation and found that large firms have a significantly higher probability of in-
troducing innovations than small firms. The difference is 37 percentage points for process
innovations and 27 percentage points for product innovations.
The result that larger firms are more likely to introduce more innovations is not
surprising due to the fact that they have more product lines and human resources to
improve upon. Taking this in account, Love and Ashcroft (1999) use a second measure
of innovativeness, which they call innovations per employee, and found that this measure
actually decreases with firm size. Hence, according to these authors, smaller plants are
indeed more innovative than large ones.
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Contributions to Employment
Most of the literature on the generation of employment by entrepreneurs states that
these firms have a disproportionately high contribution to the creation of jobs.
In one of the first articles analyzing this relationship, Fritsch (1997) shows a positive
correlation between start-up rates and employment growth in all German industries based
on regional data in the period 1986–1989. His conclusion was that a region characterized
by a higher start-up rate is associated with a higher employment increase. Folster (2000)
demonstrates the same positive effect for Sweden, as he states that “an increased share of
self-employment by one percent of the population increases total employment by about 1.3
percent of the population” (p. 143). Baldwin (1998) examines the changes in employment
shares of certain size classes of Canadian manufacturing plants. He concludes that the
smallest size class, i.e., plants employing fewer than 100 employees, has increased its
employment share by 0.57 percent annually over the period 1973–1992, whereas the larger
size classes experienced decreasing employment shares. These articles are among the
many that correlates entrepreneurship with an increase in job creation rates.
A recent stream of research, initiated by Fritsch (2008), studies aggregated data,
mostly at the regional level to analyze the direct and indirect effects of entrepreneurial
activity on employment growth (and other outcomes). Start-ups, or market entries lead
to new business development, whereas incumbent firms might be forced to be dissolved
because of the increased competition of these new entrants. Hence, indirectly, combining
the entry of new companies and the disappearing of older and less efficient ones, might
boost competitiveness and economic growth.
Mueller et al. (2008) relates start-up rates in Britain (measured by the number of
new firms per 1000 employees created annually) to regional employment changes (over
two years). Higher start-up rates are associated with higher immediate levels of employ-
ment (in these new firms themselves). However, the same authors state that after some
years the relationship of start-up rates with employment growth is negative due to the
competitive pressure that leads inefficient incumbents to fire workers or exit the market.
In the longer run though, the net effect is positive due to increased competitiveness.
Acs and Mueller (2008) finds a similar pattern for the United States. The higher the
regional start-up rate, the higher is the regional employment growth rate. The positive
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effect is stronger in the first year, then it comes down to zero after some years and
increases thereafter. Fritsch and Mueller (2008), Baptista et al. (2008) and Van Stel
and Suddle (2008) corroborate this result based on German, Portuguese and Dutch data,
respectively.
Carree and Thurik (2008) finds evidence for the same pattern based on country level
data. They find that increased business ownership rates are shown to go together with
an instantaneous small effect on employment generation, a mid-term negative effect and
a long term positive effect.
Relevant studies using disaggregated data to examine the relationship between firm
size or age and the proportional number of jobs a firm has created have come to the same
conclusion: smaller firms have the highest percentage-rate growth. Thus, proportional
to their size, small firms created more jobs than large firms. Some examples of these
studies include Calvo (2006), Hart and Oulton (1996), Konings (1995) and Oliveira and
Fortunato (2006).
All these studies are clear in indicating a positive relationship between entrepreneur-
ship and employment. However, it is also important to discuss the role of entrepreneurship
on wages and job satisfaction.
Wunnava and Ewing (2000) finds that in 1989, U.S. firms with between 100 and 500
employees, paid male employees 18 percent more than identical employees of firms with
less than 100 employees. The average wage differential between firms employing more
than 500 individuals and entrepreneurial firms amounts to 27 percent for male employees.
An explanation for this gap might be the higher skill levels of employees of large firms,
due to their higher experience and education. Brown and Medoff (2003), which studies
firm wage differentials based on age, shows that the positive correlation between firm age
and employee wages turns into a negative relationship when controlling for the workers’
heterogeneity (differences in experience, education, etc.). He states that the higher level
of wage paid by established firms is completely explained by the characteristics of their
workers. Troske (1999), argues that another explanatory factor for the wage gap between
workers in small and large firms is the presence of a complementarity between capital
and skill. The complementarity implies that workers in more capital-intensive firms are
paid higher wages. Hence, if larger firms are more capital intensive than smaller firms,
this could explain part of the gap.
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Regarding job satisfaction, there are ambiguous results in the literature. On one
hand, Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller (1999), in a study done in Switzerland, finds that
on-the-job search and actual job changes are undertaken less frequently by employees of
large firms. Thus, small firms have lower satisfaction levels than large firms.
On the other hand, Benz (2003) examines actual scores on a job satisfaction ques-
tionnaire, finding employees of smaller German, British, and Swiss firms to have higher
average job satisfaction scores than employees of larger firms in the same countries. In a
different study, Clark and Oswald (1996) obtains the same result for U.K. employees.
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Contributions to Productivity and Economic Growth
Starting by making a literature analysis of the dynamics between entrepreneurship
and labour productivity, Brouwer et al. (2005) relates the firm’s value added and the
firm’s gross output to the cost of labour based on a cross-section of about 4500 Dutch
manufacturing firms for the year 1999. The authors find that both value added and gross
output per euro of labour increase with firm size, so they conclude that entrepreneurs
appear to have a lower level of labour productivity compared to larger firms in the Dutch
manufacturing industry.
Jensen et al. (2001) recognizes several difficulties in comparing productivity levels
across plants of different ages.8 These authors state that three different effects occur
in manufacturing plants as they grow older. The first one is the positive age effect, in
the sense that older plants are more productive due to the management accumulating
experience, gains from learning by doing, or the achievement of economies of scale. The
second effect is that older plants are likely to be more productive due to a process of
natural selection: while younger firms have to prove their worth, older firms have already
survive it. Third, there is a possibly offsetting negative effect related with older plants:
since the best-practice technologies are embodied in new capital, it is more likely to
find them in start-up plants. Hence, younger plants in a given year tend to have more
productive technologies. Taking into account these three effects together, the authors
find a relatively low contribution of younger firms to labour productivity.
However, Disney et al. (2003) provides evidence in contrast to the conclusions above.
These authors find that, in the U.K. manufacturing sector between 1980 and 1992, estab-
lishments younger than one year have an average annual labour productivity (output per
person hour) 2.4 per cent higher than incumbent establishments, and five percent higher
than for exiting establishments.
A similar result was obtained by Pagano and Schivardi (2003). They analyze the
impact of the firm size distribution on the growth of labour productivity in several Euro-
pean countries and find a positive relationship between the concentration of a sector on
fewer and larger firms and labour productivity growth.
Foster et al. (2006) comes to the same conclusions fot the U.S. retail sector in the
8Note that age is positively correlated with size.
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90’s. Their results show that exiting establishments are far less productive than entering
establishments, and entering and incumbent establishments have similar productivity
levels.
As one can see from the previously mentioned literature, there is no consensus wheter
entrepreneurship has a positive or a negative effect on labour productivity, though the
evidence suggests that large firms seem to be more productive.
It is interesting to note that innovation process and economic growth can both suffer
from the lack of either research effort or entrepreneurial skills. Economic history provides
examples of both cases. Mokyr (1990) argues that the Islamic civilization, at the end
the twelfth century, severely declined its economic growth because it was not capable
of adding much new to the existing stock of ideas it retrieved and applied so brilliantly.
Mokyr also discusses notorious examples of societies, such as the Greeks and the Romans,
that suffered because of their lack of entrepreneurial skills. Such a deficit may also
well explain the economic decline of the late Victorian Britain usually attributed to the
inability of British entrepreneurship in promoting the diffusion of new and advanced
production methods.
Baldwin (1998) examines the changes in shipment shares of Canadian plant size classes
in manufacturing during the period 1973-1992. The smallest size class has increased its
shipment share by 0.18 percent on average per year, while the shares of larger size classes
have decreased or remained the same. Actually, the author shows that economic activity
has been shifted from large towards small firms. Whether the effect of such a shift is
positive in terms of economic value added depends on the relative performance of small
versus large firms and the performance improvements of large firms due to the improved
competitiveness as a consequence of more small firms.
Carree (2002) states that an increase in large firm employment shares leads to lower
value added index. Consequently, on average, a shift towards from large to small units
has led to an increase in economic growth. Brouwer et al. (2005) provides additional
support to Carree’s results as they find that the percentage growth rates in productivity,
in terms of output as well as value added relative to the costs of the factors of production
decrease with firm size.
Carree and Thurik (1998) investigates the consequences of the transformation process
in Europe’s manufacturing industries, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, from
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large firms toward small firms. Based on an industry panel covering 14 manufacturing
industries in 13 European countries, they find that, on average, the employment share
of relative large firms has a negative impact on output growth. In a more recent study,
the same authors (Carree and Thurik, 2008) relate the growth of the number of business
owners as a percentage of the labour force to GDP growth. They establish that the
initial effect on GDP growth of a higher business ownership rate is positive and there
is no significant evidence of business ownership having an indirect effect later on. This
means that an increase in entrepreneurship activity leads to a positive effect in economic
growth.
Audretsch and Thurik (2001) comes to a similar result. In their panel study for
European countries they found that a concentration towards smaller firms positively
affects growth.
Audretsch and Keilbach (2004) using regional data for 8 OECD economies, points
out that firm entry and exit affects positively regional output growth. Depending on the
region, they conclude that up to 40% of growth is associated with firm turnover. With
firm entry and exit they associate entrepreneurship and young innovative firms since entry
and exit rates are usually positively correlated.
In the same line of the previous authors, Baumol et al. (2007) argues that the devel-
opment and growth of innovative entrepreneurial companies was the driving force behind
the advanced countries technological revolution, contributing to productivity growth in
the past 15 years. Van Praag and Versloot (2008) provides a meta-study of 57 high-quality
studies on the contribution of entrepreneurs (young firms with less than 100 employees)
in economic growth measured through their macroeconomic performance. They conclude
that entrepreneurial firms engender relatively more productivity growth and produce and
commercialize high quality innovations.
Thurik (1999) provides empirical evidence from a 1984-1994 cross-sectional study of
23 OECD countries. He shows that increased entrepreneurship, as measured by business
ownership rates, is associated with higher rates of employment growth at the country
level.
Braunerhjelm et al (2004) implements different regression techniques and found sur-
prisingly robust support for entrepreneurship as one important source of growth, while
no such relationship could be established for R&D.
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Contrariwise to the effect on labor productivity, entrepreneurship seems to have a
positive effect on growth and foster economic development.
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2.3 Literature relating Trade Unions, labour and Economic Growth
2.3.1 Trade Unions
According to the Economic Times, Trade Unions are “organizations formed by workers
from related fields that work for the common interest of its members. They help workers
in issues like fairness of pay, good working environment, hours of work and benefits.
They represent a cluster of workers and provide a link between the management and
workers”.9 Pemberton (1988, p.9) provides a microeconomic foundation for the union
objective function as “the outcome of an internal bargain between the leadership and
membership”.
As stated in the introduction of this study, unions assume a leading role as a crucial
economic institution, representing a sizable portion of the workforce in most developed
countries. Union participation rates in 2001 range from 12.8% in the United States to
85.1% in Iceland (Lawson, 2011).
The economic analysis of wage and employment determination in labor markets with
the intervinience of trade unions was first explored with the work of Dunlop (1944). His
formulation assumes that the union maximizes the welfare of its members by choosing
a point on the firm’s labor demand curve. This theory formed the basis of what is now
commonly referred to as the Monopoly Union model, which will be used in this study
(Section 3.2.)
According to Dunlop and its monopoly union model, the firm chooses the level of
employment depending on the level of wages that the union previously have chosen for
their members. Hence, the union can choose their optimal point on the firm’s labour
demand curve. This choice depends on several factors such as the scarcity and uniqueness
of workers and varies between industries.
9Definition of Trade Union (July, 2017). Retrieved from:
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/trade-union
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2.3.2 How Trade Unions affect Labour, Wages and Economic Growth
The conventional point of view is that trade unions exercise their monopoly power
to improve welfare of workers, by raising their wages above the competitive level. On
the one hand, this higher demanded wage alters the distribution of income between firms
and workers. On the other hand, it might increase unemployment level which, in turn,
might slow down economic growth. This viewpoint is accepted among most of theoretical
scholars, but the empirical evidence does not support it unequivocally.
In general, growth and unemployment are intimately related for two reasons. First,
unemployment affects the scale of operation of the economy and thereby the growth rate.
Second, growth affects inter-temporal decisions of workers about where to allocate on the
labour market once they are laid off, and thereby it affects equilibrium unemployment
(De Groot, 2001).
Although traditional evidence supports an unfavorable effect of trade unions on em-
ployment (Nickell, 1997), its impact on firm’s decisions to innovate and their investment
and hence the long-term economic growth is not so consensual (Neto and Silva, 2013).
Shister (1954), Booth (1995), Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003), state that the
collective bargaining promoted by trade unions has only a residual impact on firm’s in-
vestment decisions. From the survey of the evidence from firm level data, Freeman and
Medoff (1984) and Hirsch (2004) conclude that the average union productivity effects
are statistically insignificant and, although collective bargaining governs the distribu-
tion of incomes between workers and firms, it leaves economic growth and productivity
unchanged (Clark 1984).
A similar result was obtained by Ji et al (2016), who found that labour union has
both a negative growth effect via unemployment and a positive growth effect via endoge-
nous market structure, and these two effects exactly offset each other leaving an overall
neutral effect on growth. This growth neutrality of wage-oriented unions provides a novel
implication, given that increasing wage-oriented behavior of unions may lead to what is
referred as the “Cheshire cat” phenomenon (Burda 1990), in which the union members
support a wage policy that may be inimical to the long-run survival of the union.
Recently, using aggregate national data for OECD countries, the evidence suggests a
few signs of a relationship between unionization and economic growth, either positive or
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negative.
The contradictory results motivate several studies, such as Palokangas (1996), Ramos-
Parreno and Sanchez-Losada (2002), Irmen and Wigger (2003), and Chang et al (2007).
In contrast to the traditional notion, these studies seem to highlight the possibility of a
positive effect of unionization on growth and employment.
Palokangas (1996) incorporates union wage bargain into a Romer (1990)-type model
and analyses a union bargaining over the wage of low-skilled and high-skilled labour in the
intermediate sector and he shows that the existence of the union might foster economic
growth.
In the OECD Jobs Study analyzed by Lundvall (1994), the relationship between high-
tech and high-wage sectors is explored. It is argued that production of manufacturing
goods increasingly takes place in conditions of imperfect competition. This imperfect
competition results in rents that are often shared with workers, and in wages that differ
considerably between sectors, even after controlling for age, education, occupation and
gender. These wage premiums are stable over time and their structure is roughly similar
across countries (Krueger and Summers 1988). An important reason for firms to engage
in rent sharing may be the presence of trade unions (De Groot, 2001). The potential
consequences of this are that the unemployed may prolong their job search in the hope of
getting into the high-wage firms and sectors, and displaced workers from the high-wage
firms and sectors may have very high replacement rates and hence reservation wages when
compensations are based on previous earning.
For instance, Van Reenen (1996) looks at the relationship between labour market
institutions and growth from a totally different angle. Based on a panel of British firms,
he finds strong evidence of the importance of rent-sharing. In particular, he finds that
innovating firms generally pay higher wages, while rival innovations tend to depress their
own wages. This evidence can be seen as an indication that firms engage in rent-sharing
to enhance productivity growth.
However, there are some authors who disagree with these conclusions.
Bean and Crafts (1995) shows how the operation of trade unions may result in lower
investments and growth in the economy. Firms invest to increase their profits and an
essential characteristic of many types of investments is that they have sunk-costs asso-
ciated with them. This fact puts trade unions, once investments have been made, in a
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strong bargaining position. Due to the sunk-cost character of the investment, the trade
union can extract part of the rent that is associated with the investment. Aware of this
behavior, firms will invest less under the assumption that firms and unions cannot sign
a complete contract in which the division of rents resulting from investments to be made
in the future is agreed upon. The problem described here is known as the “hold-up prob-
lem” and was formally modeled by Grout (1984). Bean and Crafts integrate this insight
into a model of endogenous growth in which R&D is aimed at developing new products.
The reward for investments resulting in the development of new products is a monopoly
profit to be earned by the inventor of the new product. In the presence of trade unions,
some of the profits are extracted by them, which reduces the incentive to develop new
products and consequently reduces growth. The main conclusions pointed out by these
authors are that the presence of unions significantly depresses total factor productivity
and that workplaces with multiple unions experience about one percentage point lower
growth of total factor productivity than single union workplaces.
The central idea in Daveri and Tabellini (2000) is that the presence of unions results
in high real wage costs. They developed an overlapping generations model in which both
labour and capital are used as inputs in the production process. Endogenous growth
results from an external effect related to the accumulation of physical capital and wages
are set by monopolistic trade unions. Higher wage costs will push firms to a more capital
intensive production process, and will result in lower employment and a reduction in the
marginal product of capital. This reduction induces a decrease in savings and growth.
Growth and unemployment are thus negatively correlated in both cross-sections and time
series, where the correlation stems from differences in wage costs between countries or
time-periods.
In the same line as these previous authors, Addison and Hirsch (1989) state that
rent-seeking behavior of unions lowers firms’ investments in physical capital, as well as in
R&D and other risky activities. This results in productivity growth being relatively low
in strongly unionized firms and industries.
Chu et al (2016) finds that an increase in the bargaining power of a wage-oriented
union leads to a decrease in employment in the domestic economy. This result has two
important implications on innovation. The first one is that unions reduce the rates of in-
novation and economic growth; the second is that they cause innovation to be directed to
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the foreign economy, which in turn causes a negative effect on domestic wages relative to
foreign wages in the long run. Their model is able to explain about half of the decrease in
relative wage between the US and the UK from 1980 to 2007. Furthermore, the decrease
in unions’ bargaining power leads to quantitatively significant welfare gains in the two
countries. This result has two important implications on innovation. Firstly, by decreas-
ing employment, an increase in the bargaining power of a wage-oriented union reduces the
rates of innovation and economic growth. This theoretical implication is consistent with
empirical studies that find negative effects of unions on innovation and growth. Secondly,
by decreasing employment and the market size of the domestic economy, an increase in
the bargaining power of a wage-oriented union causes innovation to be directed to the
foreign economy, which in turn causes a negative long run effect on domestic wages rela-
tive to foreign wages. In the long run, the negative effect on relative wage income across
countries would dominate the positive effect of labour unions on wages only in the case
that the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is large enough. .
In a more recent paper, Boone (2000) demonstrates that the existence of a union
dampens the growth rate of the economy because firms will invest too many resources in
the reduction of overhead costs so that the growth rate of the quality of a product is too
low.
Empirical studies often find that increasing the degree of unionization has a negative
effect on employment. Examples are Montgomery (1989), Blanchflower et al.(1991),
Nickell and Layard (1999) and Kroland Svorny (2007).
Other authors emphasize that the relationship between the effect of bargaining by
trade unions and economic growth is not linear and depends on several factors.
According to Lingers (2003), the union changes the allocation of high-skilled labour
between the research and the intermediate goods sector, hence, the union affects economic
growth. Two opposite effects can be observed. Firstly, there is a negative effect because
the union lowers the profits which can be earned in the intermediate sector. Therefore,
the incentive to perform R&D declines, which dampers economic growth. Secondly,
the wage of high-skilled labour declines in the intermediate sector because low-skilled
labour employment in the intermediate sector is smaller than in the competitive case.
This triggers a migration of former intermediate high-skilled worker into the research
sector thereby increasing the growth rate of the economy. Which one of these two effects
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dominates depends on the elasticity of substitution in the intermediate good production
function.
Chu et al (2016) finds that the effects of labour unions on employment, innovation and
economic growth are theoretically ambiguous and depend on their wage orientation. As
I stated above, these authors believe that in the case of wage-oriented unions, decreasing
the bargaining power of unions stimulates employment and economic growth. However,
when it comes to employment-oriented unions, increasing their bargaining power would
raise employment and growth.
These theoretical findings suggest that there is no one-size-fits-all policy when it comes
to reforming existing labour-market institutions, such as labour unions. Therefore, policy
makers should make an effort to understand the country-specific or even industry-specific
effects of labour unions.
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2.4 Literature Review conclusion and goals of the study
This study casts a bridge between these streams of literature. It develops an endoge-
nous growth model in which analyzes the role that trade unions exert in the R&D sector
and the process of financing innovation and their effects on employment and economic
growth. The economy is characterized by three sectors: (a) final good sector, in which a
good is produced employing labour and intermediate goods and the wages of workers are
defined by a trade union; (b) intermediate good sector, in which each intermediate good
is produced by a firm that monopolizes the market; and (c) R&D sector which employs
entrepreneurs and capitalists that introduce new varieties of intermediate goods in the
market. This new varieties are introduced as a result of a successful process of search and
matching in the R&D sector between entrepreneurs and capitalists. Once a successful
matching occurs, they bargain over the distribution of the monopoly rents associated
with the discovery of the new intermediate good variety.
The model studies the occupational choice of economic agents between these three
setors. They can work in the final good sector in which they earn a wage defined by
the union. Alternatively, they can work in the R&D sector, in which they can become
entrepreneurs and devote their time to came up with a new business idea or capitalists
and select the ideas they found the most valuable and finance them. In equilibrium the
expected returns of these three activities are identical.
This model is apt to descrive the funcioning of the venture capital industry, in which
entreprenerus propose their business to venture capital firms that provide funds and
technical/managerial expertise to help them launch these ideas.
This literature review presents a broad understanding and knowledge of the topics
addressed in this study. In order to have a good understanding of the concepts and
different ideas, it is important to make an exaustive analysis of the literature and, to that
effect, we gathered a vast number of papers covering different lines of tought in innovation,
entrepreneurship and their effects on employment, economic growth and productivity,
financing of innovation and trade unions.
In all the literature analyzed and to the best of our knowledge, no articles were
found addressing the specific topic we choose to study, which is the influence of trade
unions in entrepreneurial activities. Indeed, in the previous section, were presented sereval
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papers connecting and descriving the impacts of entrepreneurship on economic growth,
innovation, produtivity between others, as well as other relations, but no study was
found dealing specifically with trade unions, entrepreneurs and capitalists. Due to the
importance of this topic and the existent gap in the literature, we propose to analyze this
relationship using a standard endogenous growth model with trade unions, capitalists
and entrepreneurs.
The study is organized as follows: (a) Section 3 presents the model; (b) Section 4
presents the balanced growth path; and (c) Section 5 presents the conclusions.
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3 The Model
Following Giordani (2015), in our model the economy is composed by three different
sectors that interact with each other. These sectors are: (a) the final good sector, in which
the final product is produced competitively employing labour and intermediate goods,
present in Section 3.1; (b) the intermediate good sector, in which a specific intermediate
good is produced and sold by a firm that has the monopoly for that particular variety,
presented in Section 3.3; (c) the R&D sector, which employs entrepreneurs and capitalists
that together introduce new varieties of intermediate goods, presented in Section 3.4.
Trade unions represent workers on the final good sector and bargain their wages,
changing the reallocation of labour between these three sectors. These labour institutions
are introduced in Section 3.2.
The innovations created by the interaction between entrepreneurs and capitalists in
the R&D sector are patented and sold to intermediate good firms, which monopolize the
market for that particular variety of product. Finally, the product goes to the final good
sector where is produced to the general consumer.
In this economy the total population is denoted by L and is assumed to be growing
exponencially at a constant rate η. The agents in the economy have to choose whether
they want to work in the R&D sector, where they can act as entrepreneurs or as capi-
talists, or in the final good sector. Denoting by LE, LF , LY respectively the number of
entrepreneurs, capitalists and final good workers, the labor market clearing condition can
be written as:
LE + LF + LY = L. (1)
We will start by caracterizing the final good sector, then the intermediate good sector
and we wiil finish with the caracterization of the R&D sector.
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3.1 Final good sector
The final good for consumption Y is homogenoeous and produced by competitive
firms that combine labor and intermediate goods according to the following Cobb-Douglas
technology:
Y = L1−γY
ˆ A
0
xγj dj,
in which LY represents the total labour in the final good sector, xj represents the jth
intermediate input and A is the measure of varieties of these inputs.
For profit maximization, firms solve the following problem:
maxLY ,xj =
[
L1−γY
´ A
0
xγj dj − ωLY −
´ A
0
ρjxjdj
]
.
In this equation, x denotes the jth intermediate input, ωLY represents the labour
costs in the final good sector and pj is the price of the jth intermediate good.
The wage of the final good sector workers, ω, comes from the wage set by trade unions,
which is defined in the next section.
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3.2 Labour market framework: Monopoly trade union
In most industrielized countries, employees have the right to organize and to select
exclusive bargaining agents to negotiate collective agreements to define their wages, hours
of work, and other general conditions. They engage in concerted activity in order to
achieve mutual aid and protection. The institutions that provide this protection are
called trade unions and their main goal is to maintain or improve workers conditions
through collective bargaining with employers. These labour institutions seek to achieve a
mark-up on wages for their members compared to the situation without union presence.
According to Freeman and Medoff (1981), trade unions lead to a higher union wage
premium . In order to have power in the negociation process a union must have some
control over the total labour supply because unions’ bargaining strength is enhanced by
the percentage of workers that they represent in a determinate sector.
In this section we introduce trade unions into the model. We used the monopoly trade
union, firstly proposed by Dunlop (1944) and Ross (1948). Within this framework, the
union decides uniterally the level of wages, leaving firms with the decision of the level of
employment afterwords. Following Neto et al (2017), the utility function of the monopoly
trade union demanded by unions is assumed to have the following form:
UMU = (ωt − ω¯t)1−v(LDy,t)v.
In the previous equation ωrepresents the final good workers real wage, whileω¯represents
the perfect competition wage. The value of v(0 ≤ ν ≤ 1) states whether the union is
more employment or wage-oriented. A higher ν indicates a more employment-oriented
union. Within the Monopoly trade union framework wages are defined by the unions be-
fore the firm’s decision on the level of employment, in a way that trade union institutions
can anticipate the impact that their demanded wages levels will have on the employment
level.
The final good wage with the monopoly trade union is equal to:
ω = Φω¯,
in whichΦ = 1
1− 1−v
v
1
εL,ω
≥ 1,can be interpreted as a mark-up over this perfect compe-
tition wage. This markup can be a proxy of trade union density and countries/industries
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with higher trade union density would present a higher markup due to the higher bar-
gaining power that their unions have. As we can infer from the previous equation, a
markup higher than one (Φ > 1) will make the wage in the final good sector higher than
the perfect competition salary, while a markup equal to one (Φ = 1) will make the final
good sector wage equal to the perfect competition wage.
From the final good sector, we obtain that, without the action of unions, pj =
γ(xj/LY )
γ−1and ω¯ = (1− γ) Y
LY
.
Introducing the mark-up in the final good wage equation, we end up with:
ω = Φ
[
(1− γ) Y
LY
]
. (2)
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3.3 Intermediate good sector
There are an infinite number of firms producing j-different intermediate goods dis-
tributed along the measure [0, A] .The intermediate good firms dominate the market for
a particular variety of a good, in which they become monopolists. This happens because
they purchased the unique and infinite-lived patent for a variety of an intermediate good
from a particular entrepreneur in the R&D sector. One unit of raw capital, rented at rate
r, produces one unit of any intermediate input. For simplification purposes, we assume
that there is no depreciation.
The jth intermediate good producer maximizes the following standard monopoly
problem:
maxxj [ρj(xj)xj − rxj] .
Substituing for pj given above and maximizing it is obtained:
xj =
(
r
γ2
) 1
γ−1
LY ≡ x and ρj = rγ ≡ ρ∀j.
The monopoly profits can be defined as:
pij = γ(1− γ)Y
A
≡ pi∀j. (3)
Quantities, prices and profits are independent of the specific variety produced. Hence,
K =
´ A
0
xjdj =
´ A
0
xdj = Ax.
As a result, the aggregate production function can be written as:
Y = (K)γ(ALY )
1−γ. (4)
Taking into account that the functional distribution of income implies
ωLY + rK + piA = Y ,
by using (2) and (3), i.e., the values for ωand pi respectively, we get:
r = Y−Y Φ+Y Φδ−Y δ+Y δ
2
K
.
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3.4 R&D sector
Entrepreneurs come up with ideas for new innovations, however they need the financial
support of capitalists to provide the necessary capital to introduce this new varieties of
products in the market. A patent is granted to each new design, and a successful innovator
gets exclusive rights over the use of his unique product. Thus, a successful match between
an entrepreneur and a capitalist generates profits from the introduction and sale of a new
innovation.
Following Giordani (2015), in our model the innovation is the result of a process of
succesfull matching between an entrepreneur and a capitalis.
The aggregate innovation function, that represents the production function of knowl-
edge, is a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas technology, represented by:
A˙ = β (LE)
a (LF )
1−a . (5)
In this aggregate innovation function, the A represents the (increasing) measure of
ideas that are lately incorporated into intermediate input varieties, β > 0, is a produc-
tivity parameter that captures the efficiency of the matching process.
When a = 1, the model colapses into a semi-endogenous growth model and the mea-
sure of ideas will be equal to the number of entrepreneurs in the market times the efficiency
of the matching process.
Given the matching function in (5), the instantaneous probability of matching of
entrepreneurs and capitalists is:
αE =
A˙
LE
= β.(LF
LE
)1−a,
while the one for capitalists is
αF =
A˙
LF
= β.(LF
LE
)a.
Now, we are going to analyze the occupational choice of the agents in this economy.
An agent working in the final good sector gains a wage, denoted by w, while agents that
choose to become entrepreneurs or capitalists gain, respectively, v0E and v
0
F . v
0
E represents
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the chance of a successfull matching with a capitalist for an entrepreneur, whereas v0F
represents the chance of a successfull matching with a entrepreneur for a capitalist. Hence,
in equilibrium,w = v0E = v
0
F must hold.
The expected payoff associated with becoming a capitalist is defined by:
rv0F = αF (v
1
F − v0F ) + v˙0F ,
in which v1F represents the value of a successfull matching for a capitalist. This value
is given by the following expression:
rv1F = (1− θ¯)pi + v0F − v1F + v˙1F .
In this equation, (1 − θ¯)pi represents the fraction of monopoly rents going to the
capitalist prevailing in that particular market.
Solving the system in v0F and v
1
F , it is obtained
v0F =
(1− θ¯)piαF
(r − v˙0F
v0F
) + αE(r − v˙
1
F
v1F
) + (r − v˙1F
v1F
)(r − v˙0F
v0F
)
.
The value v1F can be found by sustituting for the expression above into:
v1F =
(1− θ¯)pi + v0F
1 + r − v˙1F
v1F
The expected payoff associated with becoming an entrepreneur is defined by the fol-
lowing equation:
rv0E = αE(v
1
E − v0E)− v˙0E. (6)
The variable r represents the rental rate of capital, while v1E represents the value of
a sucessfull matching with a capitalist for an entrepreneur. Notice that v0E is different
from v1E.The first one represents an expected value while the second one represents the
value of the match (the same logic can be applied to v0F , v
1
F ). Equation (6) states that
the value of choosing to become an entrepreneur must be equal to the probability of a
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sucessfull matching with a capitalist times the payoff associated with this chance (plus
the capital gains/losses that may occur over time).
The value of v1E is defined by:
rv1E = θ¯pi + v
0
E − v1E + v˙1E. (7)
In this equation, θ¯pi is the fraction of the monopoly profits going to the entrepreneur
prevailing in that particular market. An analogous interpretation of equation (6) can be
made for the equation (7).
Solving the system in v0E and v
1
E, we obtain
v0E =
θ¯piαE
(r− v˙
0
E
v0
E
)+αE(r−
v˙1
E
v1
E
)+(r− v˙
1
E
v1
E
)(r− v˙
0
E
v0
E
)
The value of v1Ecan be obtained substituting the expression of v
0
Egiven above into the
following:
v1E =
θ¯pi+v0E
1+r− v˙
1
E
v1
E
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3.5 Consumption decisions
The economy is populated by an infinitely-lived consumes and collects income from
supplying labor. The representative household maximizes:
U =
ˆ ∞
0
exp [−ρt] c(t)
1−φ − 1
1− φ dt,
in which c represents C/L (consumption per capita), under the usual budget con-
straint: K˙ = Y −C. p > 0 is the subjective discount rate, and φ > 0 is the inverse of the
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. The time path of consumption per capita must
obey the following Euler equation:
c˙
c
=
1
φ
(r(t)− ρ− η) (8)
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4 Balanced growth path
From this section on we will focus on the steady state. According to the labour market
clearing condition must had along the balanced growth path, gLF = gLE = gLY = η.
Dividing the aggregate innovation function (5) by A, is is obtained:
gA =
β(LE)
a(LF )
1−a
A
,
which, taking logs and derivatives, gives us
gA = η.
This expression states that the rate of technological progress in the economy is equal
to the growth rate of the population. Taking into account the expression of the aggregate
production function represented in (4), the growth rate of income per capita must be
equal to the growth rate of the population (Y
L
= γ = η). From (8), and knowing that
c˙/c = y˙/y, we can determine the value of r along the steady state, which is equal to:
r = η(φ+ 1) + ρ. (9)
Using equation (6), in the steady state we have v˙0E/v
0
E = v˙
1
E/v
1
E. Dividing (7) by v
1
E
and rearranging we get:
1 + r − v0E
v1E
− ˙vE1
v1E
= θ¯pi
v1E
.
Since all terms on the left side of the equation (1 + r − v0E
v1E
− ˙vE1
v1E
) are constant along
the steady state, then v˙1E/v
1
E = p˙i/pi. From (3) we know that p˙i/pi = η, which implies that
˙˙ 0E/v
0
E = v
1
E/v
1
E = η. Along the steady state, and using equation (9), the values of v
0
E
and v1E can be expressed as:
v0E =
θ¯piαE
(ηφ+ ρ)(1 + αE) + (ηφ+ ρ)2
; v =
θ¯pi + v0E
1 + ηφ+ ρ
. (10)
Repeting the same steps for v0F and v
1
F , it is obtained:
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v0F =
(1− θ¯)piαF
(ηφ+ ρ)(1 + αF ) + (ηφ+ ρ)2
andv1F =
(1− θ¯)pi + v0F
1 + ηφ+ ρ
. (11)
Defining employment across the three activities in share values, we can characterize
the steady state equilibrium as the triple (lY , lE, lF ) that solves the following system:

v0E = w
v0F = w
lE + lF + lY = 1,
(12)
where the expressions for v0E, v
0
F and w are respectively given in (10), (11) and (2).
The equations v0E = w and v
0
F = w state that, in equilibrium, the returns in the final
good sector must be equal to the expected returns from developing entrepreneurial or
capitalist activities, respectively. Notice that w is a certain value while v0E and v
0
F are
expected values. These three variables must be equal in equilibrium, even for risk-averse
agents. As in Giordani (2015), the two first equations can be interpreted as the best
response functions of entrepreneurs and capitalists while the third equation of (13) repre-
sents the labour market-clearing condition. Analizying this system we can conclude that
there are a strategic complementarity between entrepreneurs and capitalists (∂lE/∂lF > 0;
∂lF/∂lE > 0), meaning that an increase in lF raises the probability of matching αE for an
entrepreneur, raising the expected returns of becoming an entrepreneur which induces a
rise in the number of agents that want to become entrepreneurs. The exactly same logic
can be applied to capitalists.
Using (11), (12), (2) and (3) and A˙/A = n, αE = A˙/LE, αF = A˙/LF , we can rewrite
the system (12) as

1
Φ
ηθ¯γ
lY
lE
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
1
Φ
η(1−θ¯)γ lY
lF
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
lE + lF + lY = 1,
(13)
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where αE = β.(lF/lE)
1−aand αF = β.(lE/lF )a.
It is important to note that, as in Giordani (2015), this equation system cannot be
solved explicitly in the three unknown variables, lE, lF , lY . Hence, in line with the eco-
nomic literature on search and matching (Pissarides, 1984), we assume that entrepreneurs
and capitalists enrol in a bargaining process over the distribution of the monopoly rents.
This is analysed in the next section.
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4.1 Steady-state under Nash bargaining of monopoly rents
When a successful matching occurs between an entrepreneur and a capitalist, both
start a bargaining process over the profits generated by the match (pi). Hence, they
negociate over their respective stare of monopoly profits (θ, 1 − θ), taking as given the
the shares prevailing in the market (¯θ, 1 − θ¯). Using (10) and (11), we can define the
surpluses for the capitalists and entrepreneurs as:
SF = v
1
F − v0F =
(1− θ)pi + v0F
1 + ηφ+ ρ
− v0F =
(1− θ)pi − v0F (ηφ+ ρ)
1 + ηφ+ ρ
. (14)
SE = v
1
E − v0E =
θpi + v0E
1 + ηφ+ ρ
− v0E =
θpi − v0E(ηφ+ ρ)
1 + ηφ+ ρ
, (15)
The Nash bargaining problem is the one of maximizing the following expression with
respect to θ:
(SE)
σ.(SF )
1−σ,
where σ represents the bargaining power of the entrepreneur in the market. Taking
the first order condition and simplifying the equation, we obtain:
σSF − (1− σ)SE = 0.
Introducing the values for SE, SF represented in (14,15) into the expression above and
simplifying we obtain:
θpi = σpi + (1− σ)v0E(ηφ+ ρ)− σv0F (ηφ+ ρ). (16)
Taking into account that
v0E =
θ¯piαE
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
,v0F =
(1−θ¯)piαF
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
,
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in which θ¯ is the profit share of the entrepreneur prevalent in the market, and plugging
these values into (16), we obtain
θpi = σpi + (1−σ)θ¯piαE
1+αE+ηφ+ρ
− σ(1−θ¯)piαF
1+αF+ηφ+ρ
Finally, knowing that in equilibrium θ = θ¯, we can solve for θ¯ to obtain:
θ¯b =
σ(αE + 1 + ηφ+ ρ)
1 + ηφ+ ρ+ σαE + (1− σ)αF . (17)
In this expression b stands for bargaining.
Given that lbE/l
b
F = σ/(1 − σ), the probabilities of matching along the steady state
can be written as:
αE = β(
lbF
lbE
)1−a = β(1−σ
σ
)1−a and αF = β(
lbE
lbF
)a = β(1−σ
σ
)a.
Plugging (17) into the system (13) and introducing the values of αE and αF , we can
obtain:

1
Φ
ηγlY
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
= lE
σ
1
Φ
ηγlY
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
= lF
1−σ
lE + lF + lY = 1.
(18)
From this system of equations one can show that lbE/l
b
F = σ/(1− σ). As in Giordani
(2015), this implies that the relative importance of entrepreneurs over capitalists reflects
their respective bargaining power. In particular it is lbE > l
b
F if and only if σ > 1/2,
that is, if and only if the bargaining power of entrepreneurs is higher that the one of
capitalists.
Solving (18) for lbE, l
b
F and l
b
Y we get:

lbE =
ηγσ
ηγ+Φ[(ηφ+ρ)(1+ηφ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σσ )1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ1−σ )a)]
lbF =
ηγ(1−σ)
ηγ+Φ[(ηφ+ρ)(1+ηφ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σσ )1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ1−σ )a)]
lbY =
[(ηφ+ρ)(1+ηφ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σσ )1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ1−σ )a)]
Φ−1ηγ+[(ηφ+ρ)(1+ηφ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σσ )1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ1−σ )a)]
.
(19)
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4.1.1 Comparative Statistics
As stated in the introduction, one of the main novelties of this thesis is that it al-
lows the possibility to study the impact of trade unions on the relationship between
entrepreneurs and capitalists. In particular, this can be done by analyzing the distribu-
tion of labor across the three sectors.
Firstly, regarding the final good sector ∂lbY /∂Φ > 0, which means that a higher trade
union markup corresponds to a higher level of employment in this sector. Although this
result might seem straightforward, it is interesting to note that, by demanding a higher
wage than the perfect equilibrium scenario, which is associated with a higher markup,
unions are also able to increase employment. This is due to a reallocation effect: a
a higher wage in the final good sector deters individuals to become entrepreneurs and
capitalists - note that ∂lbE/∂Φ < 0 and ∂l
b
F/∂Φ < 0. This seems to be in line with Figure
5 and Figure 6 which present a positive relationship between trade union’s markup and
the employment level in the service sector, a proxy of the employment level in the final
goods sector.
Figure 5: Relation of people working in the services sector with trade union density in
OECD between 2000 and 2014, available at http://stats.oecd.org (accessed on July 2017)
Secondly, in line with Giordani (2015) , one can show that an increase in the en-
trepreneurs’ bargaining power leads to a higher (lower) number o entrepreneurs (cap-
48
Figure 6: Relation of people working in the services sector with trade union density in
OECD in 2014, available at http://stats.oecd.org (accessed on July 2017)
italists) - ∂lbE/∂σ > 0 (∂l
b
F/∂σ < 0). Interestingly, since our model include both the
bargaining power of entrepreneurs (or, inversely, of capitalists) and the trade union’s
markup, it is possible to infer that a higher bargaining power of entrepreneurs affects
the effectiveness of the trade union’s markup of reallocating individuals from being an
entrepreneur to a worker in the final good sector. The economic reasoning behind is
the following: a higher bargaining power of entrepreneurs implies a higher surplus and a
lower willingness from individuals to move to the final good sector.
Finally, following Giordani (2015), it is possible to analyze the relationship between
employment in the R&D sector (lE, lF ) and the remaining parameters of the model.
Analyzing the system (19), we know that ∂lbE/∂ρ < 0 and ∂l
b
F/∂ρ < 0, which means
that the higher the discount rate, the lower the amount of resources devoted to innovative
activities. It is also possible to conclude that ∂lbE/∂φ < 0 and ∂l
b
F/∂φ < 0, implying that
the lower the willingness to substitute consumption over time (higher φ), the lower the
employment in the R&D sector.
Furthermore, ∂lbE/∂β < 0 and ∂l
b
F/∂β < 0, which means that a higher productivity
of the innovation function shifts resources from the R&D sector to the final good sector.
Moreover, it is possible to infer that ∂lbE/∂η > 0 and ∂l
b
F/∂η > 0, which means that
the effect of the growth rate on the R&D sector is positive. Finally, it is interesting to
note that∂lbE/∂a > 0 and ∂l
b
F/∂a > 0 if and only if σ > 1/2, implying that a higher
49
productivity of entrepreneurs has a positive effect on the overall employment in the R&D
sector if and only if their bargaining power is higher than the one of capitalists.
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5 Conclusions
In this thesis we have studied the impact of trade unions on the relationship between
entrepreneurs and capitalists, within an economic growth model. Section 2 provided
the first bibliometric exercise on the topic. From this section the main findings are the
following: (a) 66% of the papers regarding the link between entrepreneurship-growth are
categorized, in terms of methodology, as “formal” and “empirical”; (b) almost 90% of
the papers relating the link trade unions-growth are categorized as “formal”, “empirical”
and “formal and empirical”. From the additional literature review, to the best of our
knowledge, we concluded that was no theoretical study dealing specifically with trade
unions, entrepreneurs, and capitalists. Section 3 presented a theoretical model, following
the contributions of Giordani (2015). By introducing a trade union on the final good
sector (as in Neto et. al., 2017), it was possible to study the reallocation of labor among
the three sectors in the model. Hence, from the theoretical model, the main conclusions
are the following: (a) a higher trade union’s markup corresponds to a higher (lower) level
of employment in the final good (entrepreneur and capitalist) sector(s); (b) it is possible to
infer that an a higher bargaining power of entrepreneurs effects the effectiveness of trade
union’s markup of reallocating individuals from being an entrepreneur to a worker in the
final good sector. Finally, as future work, it would be interesting to extend this analysis
to a Schumpeterian growth model, where the success of innovations could depends on the
matching between entrepreneurs, capitalists, and trade unions.
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6 APPENDIX
6.1 Appendix A: Final good sector
Y = L1−γY
´ A
0
xγj dj
maxLY ,xj =
[
L1−γY
´ A
0
xγj dj − ωLY −
´ A
0
ρjxjdj
]
6.2 Appendix B: Labour market framework: Monopoly trade
union
ω = (1− γ) Y
LY
U = (ωt-ω¯)
1−v(Ly)v
(=)(1− v)(ωt − ω¯)−v∗1∗(Ly)D+(ωt − ω¯)1−vv(LDy )v−1 ∗ ∂Ly2w = 0 (=)
(=)(1− v)(ωt − ω¯)∗(Ly)D+(ωt − ω¯)v( (LyD)vLy ∗
∂LDy
∂w
∗ωt
ωt
= 0(=)
(=)(1− v)(ωt−ω¯)−v∗(Ly)D + (wt − ω¯)1−vv + (LDy )v ∗ (−εLy, ω) ∗ 1ωt = 0(=)
(=)(1− v)(ωt − ω¯)−v = (ωt − ω)1−vv( (L
D
y )
v
W
)εLy, ω(=)
(=)(1− v)(LDy )v = (ωt − ω¯) ∗ v( (L
D
y )
v
Wt
)εLy, ω(=)
(=)(ωt − ω¯) = 1−vv ∗ ωtεLy,w (=)
(=)ωt −
[
1−v
v
Wt
εLy,Wt
]
= ω¯(=)
(=)ωt(1− 1−vv ∗ 1εLy,Wt )(=)
(=)ωt =
1
x
ω¯
1
x
= Φ
ωt = Φω¯
ω = Φ(1− γ) Y
LY
6.3 Appendix C: Intermediate good sector
The intermediate good producer solves the following problem
maxxj [ρj(xj)xj − rxj] .
xj =
(
r
γ2
) 1
γ−1
LY ≡ x
ρj =
r
γ
≡ ρ∀j.
52
pij = γ(1− γ)YA ≡ pi∀j.
K =
´ A
0
xjdj =
´ A
0
xdj = Ax.
Y = wLY + rK + piA
(=)Y = ΦwLY + rK + piA
(=)Y = Φ
[(
1− δ) Y
LY
)]
LY + rK +
[
δ (1− δ) Y
A
]
A
(=)Y = Φ (1− δ)Y + rK + δ(1− δ)Y
(=)Y − Φ (1− δ)Y − δ(1− δ)Y = rK
(=)r = Y−Y Φ+Y Φδ−Y δ+Y δ
2
K
6.4 Appendix D: R&D sector
A˙ = β (LE)
a (LF )
1−a
αE =
A˙
LE
= β.(LF
LE
)1−a
αF =
A˙
LF
= β.(LF
LE
)a
rv0E = αE(v
1
E − v0E)− v˙0E
rv1E = θ¯pi+v
0
E − v1E + v˙1Erv
0
E = αE(v
1
E − v0E) + v˙E0
rv1E = θpi + v
0
E − v1E + v˙E0
(=)
r(
rv0E
αE
+ v0E − ˙vE
0
αE
) = θpi + v0E − ( rv
0
E
αE
+ v0E − ˙vE
0
αE
) + v˙E
1
−−−−−
(=)
−−−−−r2v0E
αE
+ rv0E − r ˙vE
0
αE
= θpi − rvE
αE
0 + ˙vE
0
αE
+ v˙E
1
(=)

−−−−−
v0E =
θpi− rv
0
E
αE
+
˙vE
0
αE
+ ˙vE
1− r
2v0E
αE
+
r ˙vE
0
αE
r
(=)
−−−−−v0E = θpir − rv0EαEr + ˙vE0αEr + ˙vE1r − r2v0EαEr + r ˙vE0αEr
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(=)

−−−−−
v0E =
θpiαE
r− ˙vE0
v0
E
+αEr−αE ˙vE
1
v1
E
+r2−r ˙vE0
v0
E
−r ˙vE1
v1
E
+(
˙vE
1
v1
E
)(
˙˙ 0
v0
E
)vE
(=)

r2v0E
αE
+ rv0E +
rv0E
αE
= θpi + r ˙vE
0
αE
+ ˙vE
0
αE
+ v˙E
1
−−−−−
(=)
−−−−−r2v0E + rv0EαE + rv0E = θpiαE + rv˙E0 + v˙E0 + αE v˙E1
(=)
−−−−−v0E(r2 + rαE + r) = θpiαE + rv˙E0 + v˙E0 + αE v˙E1
(=)
−−−−−v0E = θpiαE+r ˙vE0+ ˙vE0+αE ˙vE1r2+rαE+r
Different derivation:rv
0
E = αE(v
1
E − v0E) + v0E
rv1E = θ¯pi + v
1
E − v0E + v˙1E
(=)
−−−−−v1E(r + 1) = θ¯pi + v0E + v˙1E
(=)
−−−−−v1E = θ¯pi+v0E+v˙1E(r+1)
(=)
rv
0
E = αE
[(
θ¯pi+v0E+v˙
1
E
r−1
)
− v0E
]
+ v0E
−−−−−
(=)
rv
0
E = αE ∗ θpir+1 + αE
v0E
r+1
+ αE
˙vE
0
r+1
− αE ∗ v0E + v0E
−−−−−
(=)
rvE − αE ∗
v0E
r+1
+ αE ∗ v0E − v0E = αE ∗ θpir−1 + αE ∗ ˙vE
1
r−1
−−−−−
(=)
v
0
E(r − αEr+1 + αE − 1) = αE ∗ θpir+1 + αE ∗ ˙vE
1
r+1
−−−−−
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(=)

v0E =
αE∗θpi+αE ˙vE1
r+1
r− αE
r+1
+αE−1
−−−−−
(=)

v0E =
αE∗θpi0+αE∗ ˙vE1
r+1
r2+r−αE+αEr+αE−r+1
r+1
−−−−−
(=)
v
0
E =
αE∗θpi+αE ˙vE1
r2−αE+αEr+αE+1
−−−−−
6.5 Appendix E: Consumption decisions
U =
´∞
0
exp− [−pt] c(t)1−θ
1−θ dt
c˙
c
= 1
φ
(r(t)− ρ− η)
(=)n = 1
φ
r − 1
φ
ρ− 1
φ
η
(=)r = η + 1
φ
ρ+ 1
φ
η
(=)r = η(1 + φ) + ρ
6.6 Appendix F: The balanced growth path
gLF = gLE = gLY = n
Dividing the production function of ideas by A
gA =
β.(LE)
a(LF )
1−a
A
gA = n
Moreover, dividing the equation of rv1E by v
1
E and rearranging, we get
rv1E=θpi+v
0
E−v1E+ ˙vE1
v1E
(=)r = θpi
v1E
+
v0E
v1E
− 1 + ˙vE1
v1E
(=)1 + r − v0E
v1E
− ˙vE1
v1E
= θpi
v1E
v0E =
θ¯piαE
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
v1E =
θ¯pi+v0E
1+ηφ+ρ
v0F =
(1−θ¯)piαF
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
v1F =
(1−θ¯)pi+v0F
1+ηφ+ρ
We can characterize the steady state equilibrium as the triple (lY , lE, lF ) that solves
the following system:
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
v0E = Φw
v0F = Φw
lE + lF + lr = 1
(=)

θ¯piαE
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
= Φ((1− γ) Y
LY
)
(1−θ¯)piαF
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
= Φ((1− γ) Y
LY
)
lE + lF + lr = 1
(=)

θ¯piαE
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
=
Φ((1−γ) Y
LY
).(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)
2
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
(1−θ¯)piαF
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
=
Φ((1−γ) Y
LY
).(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)
2
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
lE + lF + lr = 1
(=)

θ¯piαE
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
=
Φ((1−γ) Y
LY
).(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)
2
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
(1−θ¯)piαF
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
=
Φ((1−γ) Y
LY
).(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)
2
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
lE + lF + lr = 1
(=)

θ¯piαE
Φ(1−γ) Y
LY
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
(1−θ¯)piαF
Φ(1−γ) Y
LY
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
lE + lF + lr = 1
(=)

θ¯(γ(1−γ)Y
A
)( A˙
LF
)
Φ(1−γ) Y
LY
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
(1−θ¯)(γ(1−γ)Y
A
)( A˙
LE
)
Φ(1−γ) Y
LY
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
lE + lF + lr = 1
(=)

θ¯γ(1−γ)Y A˙
A
. 1
LE
Φ(1−γ) Y
LY
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
(1−θ¯)γ(1−γ)Y A˙
A
. 1
LF
Φ(1−γ) Y
LY
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
lE + lF + lr = 1
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(=)

θ¯γ(1−γ)Y.n. 1
LE
Φ(1−γ) Y
LY
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
(1−θ¯)γ(1−γ)Y.n. 1
LF
Φ(1−γ) Y
LY
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
lE + lF + lr = 1
(=)

θ¯γ.Y.n. 1
LE
Φ. Y
LY
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
(1−θ¯)γ.Y.n. 1
LF
Φ. Y
LY
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
lE + lF + lr = 1
(=)

1
Φ
ηθ¯γY
1
LE
Y
LY
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
1
Φ
η(1−θ¯)γY
1
LF
Y
LY
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
lE + lF + lr = 1
(=)

1
Φ
ηθ¯γY
1
LE
Y
LY
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
1
Φ
η(1−θ¯)γY
1
LF
Y
LY
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
lE + lF + lr = 1
(=)

1
Φ
ηθ¯γY
1.LY
Y.LE
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
1
Φ
η(1−θ¯)γY 1.LY
Y.LF
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
lE + lF + lr = 1
(=)

1
Φ
ηθ¯γ
LY
LE
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
1
Φ
η(1−θ¯)γ LY
LF
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
lE + lF + lr = 1
(=)

1
Φ
ηθ¯γ
lY
lE
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
1
Φ
η(1−θ¯)γ lY
lF
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
lE + lF + lr = 1
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6.7 Appendix G: The steady state under Nash bargaining of
monopoly rents
We can define the surpluses as:
SE=v
1
E − v0E = θpi+v
0
E
1+nφ+ρ
− v0E = θpi−v
0
E(ηφ+ρ)
1+ηφ+ρ
SF = v
1
F − v0F = (1−θ)pi+v
0
F
1+ηφ+ρ
− v0F = (1−θ)pi−v
0
F (ηφ+ρ)
1+ηφ+ρ
The Nash bargaining problem is the one of maximizing the following expression in
respect to θ
(SE)
σ.(SF )
1−σ = 0
(=)σ(SE)
σ−1(SF )1−σ + (SE)σ(1− σ)(SF )(1−σ)−1(−1)
(=)σ(SE)
σ−1(SF )1−σ + (SE)σ(1− σ)(SF )−σ(−1)
(=)σ(SE)
σ−1(SF )1−σ − (SE)σ(1− σ)(SF )−σ
(=)σSF − (1− σ)SE = 0
σSF − (1− σ)SE = 0
Introduing the values for SE, SF
σ(
(1−θ)pi−v0F (ηφ+ρ)
1+ηφ+ρ
)− (1− σ)( θpi−v0E(ηφ+ρ)
1+ηφ+ρ
) = 0
(=)
σ(1−θ)pi−σv0F (ηφ+ρ)−(1−σ)(θpi)+(1−σ)(v0E(nφ+ρ))
1+nφ+ρ
= 0
(=)−σv0F (ηθ + ρ) + (1− σ)v0E(ηφ+ ρ) + σpi = θpi
Knowing that
v0E =
θ¯piαE
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
v0F =
(1−θ)piαF
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
Plugging these values
θpi = σpi + (1− σ)( θpiαE
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
)(ηφ+ ρ)-σ( (1−θ¯)piαF
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
(ηφ+ ρ)
(=)θpi = σpi + ( (1−σ)θ¯piαE
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
)(ηφ+ ρ)− ( σ(1−θ¯)piαF
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
(ηφ+ ρ)
(=)θpi = σpi + ( (1−σ)θ¯piαE
ηφ+ρ+1+αE
)− ( σ(1−θ¯)piαF
ηφ+ρ+1+αF
)
Finally, knowing that in equilibrium θ = θ¯,we can solve to θ¯
θpi = σpi + ( (1−σ)θ¯piαE
ηφ+ρ+1+αE
)− ( σ(1−θ¯)piαF
ηφ+ρ+1+αF
)
(=) θ¯pi(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
= σpi(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
+ ((1−σ)θ¯piαE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
− (σ(1−θ¯)piαF )(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(=)
¯¯(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )θ
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
= σpi(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
+ ((1−σ)θ¯piαE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
− (σ(1−θ¯)piαF )(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
− pi(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(=)
¯¯(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )θ
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
= σpi(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
+ (1−σ)(piαE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
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− (σ)(piαF )(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
−pi(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(=)
¯θ(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
= σ
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
+ (1−σ)(piαE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
− (σ)(piαF )(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(=)
¯θ(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
= (1−σ)(piαE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
− (piαF )(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(=)
¯θ(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
= (1−σ)(piαE)(ηφ)+(1−σ)(piαE)ρ+(1−σ)(piαE)+(1−σ)(piαE)(αF )
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
− (piαF )(ηφ)+(piαF )(ρ)+(piαF )+(piαF )(αE)
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(=)
¯θ(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
=
(−σ)(piαE)(ηφ)+(piαE)(ηφ)+(−σ)(piαE)(ρ)+(piαE)(ρ)+(−σ)(piαE)+(piαE)+(−σ)(piαE)(αF )+(piαE)(αF )
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
− (piαF )(ηφ)+(piαF )(ρ)+(piαF )+(piαF )(αE)
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(=) θ(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
=
(−σ)(piαE)(ηφ)+(piαE)(ηφ)+(−σ)(piαE)(ρ)+(piαE)(ρ)+(−σ)(piαE)+(piαE)
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
(=) + (−σ)(piαE)(αF )+(piαE)(αF )−(piαF )(ηφ)−(piαF )(ρ)−(piαF )−(piαF )(αE)
(ηφ+ρ+1+αE)(ηφ+ρ+1+αF )
...
(=)θ¯b = σ(αE+1+ηφ+ρ)
1+nφ+ρ+σαE+(1−σ)αF
Plugging the expression for θ¯bgiven the above system and simplifying where possible
we finally obtain
1
Φ
ηθ¯γ
lY
lE
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
1
Φ
η(1−θ¯)γ lY
lF
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
lE + lF + lr = 1
(=)

1
Φ
η
σ(αE+1+ηφ+ρ)
1+nφ+ρ+σαE+(1−σ)αF γ
lY
lE
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αE)+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
1
Φ
η(1−( σ(αE+1+ηφ+ρ)
1+nφ+ρ+σαE+(1−σ)αF ))γ
lY
lF
(ηφ+ρ)(1+αF )+(ηφ+ρ)2
= 1
lE + lF + lr = 1
ηγlY
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηφ+ρ+σαE+(1−σ)αF ) =
lE
σ
ηγlY
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηφ+ρ+σαE+(1−σ)αF ) =
lF
1−σ
lE + lF + lY = 1
Given that lbE/l
b
F = σ/(1 − σ), the probabilities of matching along the steady state
can be written as
αbE = β(
lbF
lbE
)1−α = β(1−σ
σ
)1−a
αbF = β(
lbE
lbF
) = β( σ
1−σ )
a
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
1
Φ
ηγlY
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
= lE
σ
1
Φ
ηγlY
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
= lF
1−σ
lE + lF + lY = 1
(=)

1
Φ
ηγlY (σ)
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
= lE
1
Φ
ηγlY (1−σ)
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
= lF
lE + lF + lY = 1
(=)

1
Φ
ηγlY (σ)
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
= lE
1
Φ
ηγlY (1−σ)
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
= lF
1
Φ
ηγlY (σ)
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
+
1
Φ
ηγlY (1−σ)
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
+ lY = 1
(=)

−−−
−−−
1
Φ
ηγlY (σ)+
1
Φ
ηγlY (1−σ)+lY ((ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σσ )1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ1−σ )a))
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a))
= 1
(=)

−−−
−−−
1
Φ
lY (ηγσ+ηγ−ηγσ)+lY ((ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σσ )1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ1−σ )a))
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
= 1
(=)

−−−
−−−
1
Φ
lY (ηγ)+lY ((ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β(
1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a))
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
= 1
(=)

−−−
−−−
1
Φ
lY =
((ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)).((ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a))
((ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)).(ηγ+(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a))
(=)

−−−
−−−
1
Φ
lY =
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
ηγ+(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
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(=)

−−−
−−−
lY =
Φ(φη+ρ)2+(φη+ρ)(1+2βσa(1−σ)1−a)
ηγ+(φη+ρ)2+(φη+ρ)(1+2βσa(1−σ)1−a)
(=)

ηγlY (σ)
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
= lE
ηγlY (1−σ)
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
= lF
−−−
(=)

lE =
(ηγσ)(
Φ((φη+ρ)2+(φη+ρ)(1+2βσa(1−σ)1−a))
ηγ+(φη+ρ)2+(φη+ρ)(1+2βσa(1−σ)1−a) )
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
lF =
(ηγ−ησγ)( Φ((φη+ρ)2+(φη+ρ)(1+2βσa(1−σ)1−a)
ηγ+(φη+ρ)2+(φη+ρ)(1+2βσa(1−σ)1−a) )
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
−−−
(=)

lE =
(ηγσ)(
Φ((φη+ρ)2+(φη+ρ)(1+2βσa(1−σ)1−a))
ηγ+(φη+ρ)2+(φη+ρ)(1+2βσa(1−σ)1−a) )
(φη+ρ)2+(φη+ρ)(1+2βσa(1−σ)1−a)
lF =
(ηγ−ησγ)( Φ((φη+ρ)2+(φη+ρ)(1+2βσa(1−σ)1−a))
ηγ+(φη+ρ)2+(φη+ρ)(1+2βσa(1−σ)1−a) )
(φη+ρ)2+(φη+ρ)(1+2βσa(1−σ)1−a)
−−−
(=)

lE =
Φ(ηγσ)
ηγ+(φη+ρ)2+(φη+ρ)(1+2βσa(1−σ)1−a)
lF =
Φηγ(1−σ)
(φη+ρ)2+(φη+ρ)(1+2βσa(1−σ)1−a)
lY =
Φ((φη+ρ)2+(φη+ρ)(1+2βσa(1−σ)1−a))
ηγ+(φη+ρ)2+(φη+ρ)(1+2βσa(1−σ)1−a)
Correc¸a˜o u´ltima derivac¸a˜o (resultdos desta foram os inclu´ıdos no modelo)
1
Φ
ηγlY
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
= lE
σ
1
Φ
ηγlY
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
= lF
1−σ
lE + lF + lY = 1
(=)

1
Φ
ηγlY (σ)
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
= lE
1
Φ
ηγlY (1−σ)
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
= lF
lE + lF + lY = 1
(=)

1
Φ
ηγlY (σ)
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
= lE
1
Φ
ηγlY (1−σ)
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
= lF
1
Φ
ηγlY (σ)
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
+
1
Φ
ηγlY (1−σ)
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a)
+ lY = 1
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(=)

−−−
−−−
1
Φ
ηγlY (σ)+
1
Φ
ηγlY (1−σ)+lY ((ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σσ )1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ1−σ )a))
(ηθ+ρ)(1+ηθ+ρ+σ(β( 1−σ
σ
)1−a)+(1−σ)(β( σ
1−σ )
a))
= 1
(=)
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−−−
−−−
1
Φ
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σ
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= 1
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−−−
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1
Φ
lY (ηγ)+lY Z
Z
= 1
(=)
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−−−
−−−
lY (
ηγ
Φ
+Z)
Z
= 1
(=)
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−−−
−−−
lY (
ηγ
Φ
+ Z) = Z
(=)

−−−
−−−
lY =
Z
( ηγ
Φ
+Z)
(=)

−−−
−−−
lY =
Z
(θ−1ηγ+Z)
(=)

lE =
θ−1ηγlY (σ)
Z
lF =
θ−1ηγlY (1−σ)
Z
−−−
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(=)

lE =
θ−1ηγσ Z
(θ−1ηγ+Z)
Z
lF =
θ−1ηγ(1−σ) Z
(θ−1ηγ+Z)
Z
−−−
(=)

lE =
ηγσ
Φ
ηγ
Φ
+Z
lF =
ηγ(1−σ)
Φ
ηγ
Φ
+Z
−−−
(=)

lE =
ηγσ
ηγ+ZΦ
lE =
ηγ(1−σ)
ηγ+ZΦ
lY =
Z
(θ−1ηγ+Z)
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